There has been a troublesome anomaly in the UK between cash payment to men for sperm donation and the effective assumption that women In discussions about changing this practice at a consultative workship sponsored that month by the regulating agency, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, I -like Donald Evans -was struck by the assumption that men could only be motivated by payment, whereas women would willingly undergo the far more painful and risky procedures of super-ovulation and egg extraction for nothing.' This assumes either that men own their labour and the products of their bodies in a way that women do not, or that women's motivation is drastically different from men's, that it is not rational in the usual sense. Either way, the accepted narrative
about women's property in their bodies differs from men's story, and the prevailing narrative directly affects clinical practice.
Men can be dealt with by a recognisable contract, to sell a body product -a renewable one which does not raise quite the same horrific issues as sale of kidneys or other body parts. Women donors may not even be given reimbursement for expenses. They are effectively paying to donate their eggs, sometimes to private clinics that will profit from them -a very odd sort of contract indeed, if a contract at all. Yet eggs are a nonrenewable resource, unlike sperm: the full quota of oocytes for life are already present in a baby girl's ovaries. And there is an overall shortage of egg donors, with very few women willing to return a second time.
The greater objective value of eggs and the higher costs to the donor contrast so starkly with present practice that some commentators -Donald Evans being one2-have been led to suggest that both sexes should be paid, and that women should in fact be paid more. This approach does tackle the incongruity head-on, incorporating women into the "normal" contract mode applied to men. But it assumes that women are being asked to act irrationally by the present system -rather than seeing both sexes as capable of being motivated by something other than conventional rationality, of being capable of behaving "arationally" (to coin a distinction like that between "immoral" and "amoral".)
And do we want to encourage both sexes to take on the male-model instrumental approach to the body -particularly in an era of the commodification of practically everything? Already we can see an increasing use of market terminology in the new reproductive technologies -for example, "products of conception" or "egg harvesting". Evans's desire to substitute the term "providers" for "donors" is a milder form of the same syndrome, redolent of the purchaser-provider split in the NHS: "provider" clearly means "seller" in both contexts.
But are we in a position to sell our gametes? The debate about payment for gametes needs to look more critically at the notion of property in the body. It is generally (though wrongly) assumed that property in the body is a self-evident notion: whose body is it, if not my own? Evans' s own admission that providing gametes for pay is less admirable than donating them.)'2 When a system incorporates both paying and nonpaying elements, the altruistic element will suffer. Conversely, a system that sticks to its altruistic guns often attracts high levels ofpublic support.
As Titmuss described the American blood donation system, a preponderance of paid blood donation combines with a small quantity of voluntary donation. The voluntary system was never anything like as popular as unpaid blood donation remains in the UK, because the mixed mode encourages cynicism: why give when others are profiting? (We can see a similar phenomenon in the increasing. number of people who will not donate to the NHS blood collection centres because they fear that their blood or blood products will be sold to private hospitals.) The mixed market-voluntary mode also produced high rates of contamination of blood products, since it was primarily those who had to sell -drug addicts, predominantly -who sold. Market incentives have obvious class implications as well: empirical studies of contract motherhood demonstrate that paid surrogates are of a lower class than the men who hire them, viewing contract motherhood as the only "job" for which they can qualify.'3 Although sperm donation does not have any such obvious class bias, the greater risks and suffering involved in oocyte donation tip the scales towards the probability that only low-paid or unpaid women would be tempted by paid egg donation. But conversely, that very pain and suffering makes the altruistic act all the more worthy and appealing.
The 1990 act was right to set up a voluntary system of gamete donation. Practice has slipped from that ideal as the market element has crept in for sperm "donation", because it is patronisingly assumed that men will only respond to financial considerations. Rather than colluding in that decline, we should restore the original altruistic spirit of the act -consistently with the current legal position on surrogate motherhood, which is also valid 
